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Case № 20160646-CA 
In the Utah Court of Appeals 
South Salt Lake City, 




S. Steven Maese, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Appellant 
S T A T E M E N T  O F  J U R I S D I C T I O N  
Under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e), the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction 
over this matter. The Appellant, S. Steven Maese, appeals from convictions of 
Failure to Signal for Two Seconds, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code § 41-
6a-804(1) (2013), and Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device, a class C misde-
meanor under Utah Code § 41-6a-304 (2013). 
S T A T E M E N T  O F  I S S U E S  
POINT I. The Utah Constitution states, “… no person charged with the exer-
cise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly 
directed or permitted.” Does the Utah Constitution’s Separation of Powers clause 
prevent prosecutors from designating the level of an offense or is lawmaking a 
merely advisory exercise? 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Interpreting “the Utah Constitution is a question of law. We therefore review 
[the district court’s decision] for correctness.…”1 Maese preserved this issue by 
moving the trial court to dismiss the charges.2 
POINT II. The Utah Supreme Court stated it observed a “virtually unanimous 
intention on the part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitu-
tional right to trial by jury in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases.”3 There-
fore, does Utah’s constitutional right to a jury trial require jury trials for criminal 
infractions? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Again, interpreting “the Utah Constitution is a question of law. We therefore re-
view [the district court’s decision] for correctness.…”4 Maese preserved this issue 
by moving the trial court for a jury trial.5 
  
                                              
1 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ¶ 3, 268 P.3d 822. 
2 R. at 42-45. 
3 International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Pioneer Tractor & Implement, Inc., 626 P.2d 
418, 419 (Utah 1981). 
4 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ¶ 3, 268 P.3d 822. 
5 R. at 115-151. 
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R U L E S ,  S T A T U T E S ,  A N D  C O N S T I T U T I O N A L  P R O V I S I O N S  
This Court’s interpretation of the following rules, statutes, and constitutional 
provisions is important to the issues on appeal and their full texts are attached at 
ADDENDUM A: 
RULES 
• Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(d); 
STATUTES 
• Utah Code § 76-1-105. 
• Utah Code § 76-1-103(1). 
• Utah Code § 76-3-402. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 10. 
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. 
• Utah Constitution, Article V, Section 1. 
S T A T E M E N T  O F  T H E  C A S E  
On December 11, 2013, South Salt Lake City charged Santiago Steven Maese with 
Failure to Signal for Two Seconds, a class C misdemeanor under Utah Code § 41-
6a-804(1) (2013), and Failure to Obey a Traffic Control Device, a class C misde-
meanor under Utah Code § 41-6a-304 (2013).6 On January 29, 2014, the City 
                                              
6 R. at 2. 
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amended the charges to infractions.7 On February 19, 2014 and on constitutional 
grounds, Maese moved for a jury trial.8 The Justice Court denied the motion.9 
Following a bench trial on January 6, 2015, Judge Catherine M. Johnson con-
victed Maese of both charges.10 Judge Johnson sentenced Maese to a $240 fine.11  
On January 20, 2015 Maese sought a trial de novo and the justice court sent the 
case to district court.12 On June 22, 2016, Maese moved for a jury trial.13 The court 
denied the motion. The District Court convicted Maese of both charges.14 
S T A T E M E N T  O F  F A C T S  
On December 10, 2013, Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Roger Griffiths saw Santi-
ago Steven Maese cross the HOV lane’s double white line on I-15 and change 
lanes across several lanes while signaling for less than two seconds.15 
                                              
7 R. at 2. 
8 R. at 20. 
9 R. at 33. 
10 R. at 6. 
11 Ibid. 
12 R. at 38-39. 
13 R. at 115-151. 
14 R. at 178-179. 
15 R. at 32. 
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S U M M A R Y  O F  A R G U M E N T  
Courts throughout Utah rely on West Valley City v. McDonald for the proposition 
that amending a misdemeanor to an infraction is perfectly legal.16 And in the un-
published Hurricane City v. Barlow, citing McDonald, this Court stated in a foot-
note it “has previously determined that a city may charge a speeding violation as 
an infraction rather than a class C misdemeanor.”17 But this is incorrect. 
McDonald holds that amending misdemeanors to infractions does not violate 
Utah R. Crim. P. 4(d). That holding is valid and Maese does not challenge it. But 
that Court specifically stated Utah constitutional arguments were unpreserved. 
Yet the Utah Constitution specifically separates powers between the branches 
of government granting the legislative branch exclusive authority to define of-
fenses and designate their penalties. Still, prosecutors across the state have 
usurped the essential legislative function of designating the penalties for of-
fenses. By prosecuting a legislatively defined misdemeanor as an infraction, 
South Salt Lake City (an executive branch) impermissibly exercises an essential 
legislative function, violating Separation of Powers.  
One of the legal side effects of reducing misdemeanors to infractions—if not 
the very purpose—is depriving defendants of jury trials. But statutes and court 
                                              
16 West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
17 Hurricane City v. Barlow, 2009 UT App 115. 
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rules barring jury trials for even the most minor criminal offense, an infraction, 
violate the Utah Constitution. The plain text of the Utah Constitution’s jury trial 
provision, taken with the drafters’ clear intent and historical traditions of that 
right in Utah, guarantee the right to trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions. Any 
law or rule to the contrary is unconstitutional.  
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A R G U M E N T  
POINT I. As applied to Maese, the Traffic Offenses Charged Violate the Utah Con-
stitution’s Separation of Powers Clause; Cities Charging and Courts Adju-
dicating Legislatively-Designated Misdemeanors as Infractions is 
Prohibited. 
Allowing prosecutors to unilaterally designate a misdemeanor as an infraction is 
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution’s Separation of Powers clause; only 
the legislature can define crimes and their penalties. 
A. Designating the penalty for an offense is an essential legislative function 
which cannot be assumed by, or delegated to, another branch. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated in Carter v. Lehi City that prosecuting crimes is 
the “quintessential executive act.”18 By charging and adjudicating legislatively-
designated misdemeanors as infractions, prosecutors and courts unconstitution-
ally usurp the essential legislative function of setting criminal penalties. No state-
ment of law or legal principle allows prosecutors to exercise the essential 
legislative function of designating an offense’s penalty. The Legislature never 
delegated such authority to prosecutors or courts, nor could it under the Utah 
Constitution’s Separation of Powers provision: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to 
                                              
18 Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 46, 269 P.3d 141 (citations omitted). 
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one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to ei-
ther of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permit-
ted.19 
In State v. Gallion, the Utah Supreme Court stated the intent of Separation of 
Powers is to “prevent those, who exercise the power assigned by the Constitu-
tion to their department, from aggrandizement of their power, however derived, 
by exercising functions appertaining to another department.”20  
Gallion answered whether the Legislature properly delegated authority to the 
Utah Attorney General to add, delete, or reschedule substances proscribed by the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act.21 The Utah Supreme Court held that delegation 
violated Separation of Powers because it delegated to an executive branch official 
the authority to define those same offenses and, effectively, fix their penalties.22 
That Court stated:  
A determination of the elements of a crime and the appropriate punish-
ment therefor are, under our Constitutional system, judgments, which 
must be made exclusively by the legislature.23 
… 
                                              
19 Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. 
20 State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d 683, 687 (Utah 1977). 
21 Id. at 685. 
22 Id. at 689. 
23 Id. at 690. 
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The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essen-
tial legislative function with which it is thus vested.24 
… 
The power of the legislature to repeal or amend the penalty to be imposed 
for crime is not a matter of judicial concern. It is part of the sovereign 
power of the state, and it is the exclusive right of the legislature to change 
or amend it.25  
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court elucidated this bedrock principle 
nearly a century ago in Ex parte United States.26 There, a federal district court 
judge declined to impose a mandatory minimum sentence prescribed by Con-
gress after taking into account “the peculiar circumstances” of the defendant 
which the judge reckoned warranted leniency.27 The Court declined to recognize 
inherent judicial authority to disregard statutorily defined crimes and punish-
ments crafted through the legislative process. The Court explained: 
… if it be that the plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment 
for crime is subject to be permanently set aside by an implied judicial 
power upon considerations extraneous to the legality of the conviction, it 
would seem necessarily to follow that there could be likewise implied a 
discretionary authority to permanently refuse to try a criminal charge be-
cause of the conclusion that a particular act made criminal by law ought 
                                              
24 Id. at 687 (quoting Western Leather and Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 87 
Utah 227, 231, 48 P.2d 526, 528 (1935)). 
25 Id. at 688 (quoting Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380, 381, 483 P.2d 425 (1971)). 
26 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). 
27 See id. at 38-39. 
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not to be treated as criminal. And thus it would come to pass that the pos-
session by the judicial department of power to permanently refuse to en-
force a law would result in the destruction of the conceded powers of the 
other departments and hence leave no law to be enforced.28  
Where the overstepping judge in Ex parte United States actually considered 
facts and circumstances warranting leniency, here, the district court considered 
nothing before allowing a misdemeanor to be charged as an infraction.  
By designating the offenses charged against Maese as misdemeanors, the Leg-
islature determined that a jail sentence may be warranted, at least under some set 
of circumstances. But here, the prosecution decrees (and the trial court allows) 
that no circumstances warrant a jail sentence; not for a habitual violator; not for 
putting others in extreme danger. In this case, the trial court “permanently set 
aside” a “plain legislative command fixing a specific punishment for crime,” 
without inquiring into the factual allegations or the offender.  
Beyond State v. Gallion and Ex parte United States, we find another Utah ana-
logue in State v. Mohi. There, the Utah Supreme Court struck a statute allowing 
prosecutors to choose, with no statutory guidance, whether to prosecute minors 
charged with serious offenses as juveniles or adults, as unconstitutional.29 It 
                                              
28 Id. at 42. 
29 State v. Mohi , 901 P.2d 991, 1006 (Utah 1995) The Mohi Court never considered 
whether the statute violated Separation of Powers, but found it violated 
Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws provision. 
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stressed that “the classic ‘prosecutorial discretion’ question is which law to apply 
to an offender rather than how to apply the same law to different offenders.”30 To 
that end, “Once an offender is charged with a particular crime, that offender 
must be subjected to the same or substantially similar procedures and exposed to 
the same level of jeopardy as all other offenders so charged to satisfy the consti-
tutional requirement of uniform operation of the laws.”31  
By accepting an amendment of statutory misdemeanors to infractions, the 
trial court improperly permitted South Salt Lake to assume the essential legisla-
tive function of fixing the penalty for the offenses charged against Maese. This 
contradicts the Utah Constitution’s mandate that “no person charged with the 
exercise of powers properly belonging to one … department[], shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others.”32  
Under the Utah Constitution, only the legislature has the power to define 
crimes and prescribe penalties. 
                                              
30 Id. at 1004 (citation omitted) (emphasis by the Court). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Utah Const. art. V, § 1. 
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B. Utah Code designates the offenses misdemeanors and prohibits any re-
duction in the level of an offense before conviction. 
Although the Utah Constitution prohibits executive and judicial authority to re-
duce misdemeanors to infractions, Utah Code is equally clear on the subject. 
Long ago the Utah Legislature abolished common law crimes providing that 
“no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code, other applicable statute or 
ordinance.”33 The Code designates offenses as “felonies, misdemeanors, or in-
fractions.”34 And the Legislature determined “[a]ny offense which is an infrac-
tion within this code is expressly designated …”35 At the time of Maese’s offense, 
the Legislature designated that a “violation of any provision of the [Traffic Code] 
is a class C misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided.”36 Finally, and most im-
portantly, the Legislature mandates that “[t]he provisions of this code shall gov-
ern the construction of, the punishment for, and defenses against any offense 
defined in this code.”37 
Unquestionably, the above code governs the designation of offenses. But this 
Court’s decision in West Valley City v. McDonald implies that prosecutors are free 
                                              
33 Utah Code § 76-1-105. 
34 Utah Code § 76-3-102 (2013). 
35 Utah Code § 76-3-105. 
36 Utah Code § 41-6a-202(2) (2013). 
37 Utah Code § 76-1-103(1) (emphasis added). 
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to reduce misdemeanors to infractions. So a thought experiment: If an executive 
can choose to reduce an offense’s designation at will, what prevents it from in-
creasing an offense’s designation? Utah Code. We have no prosecutions for fel-
ony jaywalking, nor infraction homicide, because of Utah Code. An offense’s 
designation can be no more, and no less, than what statute mandates.  
Some courts question whether Maese’s interpretation would prohibit prosecu-
torial discretion to plea bargain. The answer, again, lies in Utah Code. Another 
thought experiment: Without using distinguishable facts, could an executive plea 
bargain capital murder to a class C misdemeanor? Theoretically, yes. But this is 
because of lesser included offenses: Capital homicide (death penalty) could be 
charged as aggravated murder, a first degree felony (25 to life); aggravated mur-
der could be charged as murder (15 to life), a first degree felony; murder could be 
charged as attempted murder, a second degree felony; attempted murder could 
be charged as aggravated assault, either a second or third degree felony; aggra-
vated assault could be charged as attempted aggravated assault, a Class A mis-
demeanor; attempted aggravated assault could be charged as assault, a Class B 
misdemeanor; assault could be charged as attempted assault, a Class C misde-
meanor. And all of these charges are permissible under the same facts as lesser in-
cluded offenses. This example shows prosecutors’ ability to pick which crime to 
charge. But charging homicide as an infraction is impossible under the statutory 
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scheme. Charging Maese with infraction offenses designated as misdemeanors 
by the Legislature is equally impossible. 
Although the Legislature prescribes a precise process to reduce the level of an 
offense after conviction,38 it prescribes no such process for reducing an offense’s 
designation before conviction. 
In this case, the trial court allowed South Salt Lake to charge failure to signal 
and failure to obey a traffic control device as infractions, despite Utah Code des-
ignating them Class C Misdemeanors. This charge is nonexistent and therefore 
contrary to Utah Code. 
C. The only mechanism for reducing an offense’s designation must be in-
voked post-conviction. 
In State v. Barrett, the Utah Supreme Court suggested a court commits a “rogue” 
act by reducing the degree of an offense without legislative authorization.39 Bar-
rett held the trial court abused its discretion by reducing a conviction two levels 
without agreement from the prosecution, as required under section 76-3-402.40  
                                              
38 See Utah Code § 76-3-402 “Conviction of lower degree of offense – Procedure 
and limitations” 
39 State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 13, 217 P.3d 682. 
40 Id. at ¶ 46. 
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The processes prescribed for reducing offenses after conviction, or through 
the prosecution of inchoate offenses, 41 would be superfluous if prosecutors and 
judges were free to do so at whim. In Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corrections, this 
Court stated that courts must “avoid interpretations that will render portions of a 
statute superfluous or inoperative,” thus “when two statutory provisions conflict 
in their operation, the provision more specific in application governs over the 
more general provision.”42 No provision of Utah Code permits reducing the level 
of an offense before conviction. Thus the specific provisions governing reduc-
tions of offenses, section 402, must govern. 
D. The Utah Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority cannot permit a change 
in a criminal offense’s designation. 
The plain language of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure grants no 
authority to accept an amended information reducing an offense’s statutory des-
ignation. Rule 4 never provides that the traffic offenses charged against Maese 
are infractions, nor does it provide or so much as imply the authority to reduce 
the level of an offense.  
                                              
41 See Utah Code §§ 76-4-101 through -401; for instance, an attempt to commit a 
class B misdemeanor is a class C misdemeanor (see Utah Code § 76-4-
102(1)(h).). 
42 Hall v. Utah State Dep’t of Corrections, 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958 (citations 
and quotation marks omitted). 
~ 16 ~ 
 The Utah Supreme Court’s rulemaking authority is limited by constitution 
and statute to rules relating to “procedure and evidence for use in the courts.”43 
In Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Gibbons Realty, the Utah Supreme Court distin-
guished between procedural and substantive rules, which lie outside of its rule-
making authority: 
Practice and procedure encompass the course, form, manner, means, 
method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party enforces substan-
tive rights or obtains redress for the invasion. ‘Practice and procedure’ 
may be described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the 
product thereof.44 
By permitting the arbitrary designation of offense levels, courts impermissibly 
determine the substantive “product” of the judicial process. In this case, the trial 
court has decreed not a procedural step, but the outcome of the process—a con-
viction or acquittal for an infraction rather than a misdemeanor.  
Also, the trial court’s reliance on West Valley City v. McDonald is misplaced.45 
Given the arguments before it, this Court in McDonald was necessarily limited to 
considering the rights of the defendant under Rule 4. Whereas here, Maese chal-
                                              
43 Utah Const. art. VIII, § 4; Utah Code § 78A-3-103(1). 
44 Brickyard Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Gibbons Realty, 668 P.2d 535, 539 (Utah 1983) 
(quoting Avila South Condominium Assoc. v. Kappa Corp., Fla., 347 So.2d 599, 608 
(1977)). 
45 See R. 62, ¶ 2 (citing McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)). 
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lenges the authority of courts and prosecutors to designate the penalty for an of-
fense under the Utah Constitution. Just as the First Amendment does not explic-
itly prohibit treasonous speech, it does not permit it either. At that, this Court in 
McDonald never addressed whether an interpretation of Rule 4 that permits the 
amendment of a misdemeanor to an infraction exceeded courts’ rulemaking au-
thority or violated Separation of Powers. It does both. 
The McDonald Court acknowledged, “The charge in the amended infor-
mation—speeding…—was exactly the same as in the original information; only 
the classification, and therefore the penalty, was changed.”46 Prosecutors and judges 
enjoy no authority under Utah law to change the penalty for an offense. 
Accordingly, under the interpretive maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius 
(“the inclusion of one implies the exclusion of the alternative”),47 the Legislature 
prohibits the prosecutorial and judicial authority claimed here. That is, the Legis-
lature has expressed when and how the level of an offense may be reduced—af-
ter conviction, by the court, upon a number of certain findings, and limited by 
                                              
46 West Valley City v. McDonald, 948 P.2d 371, 373-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (em-
phasis added). 
47 Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 15, 158 P.3d 540. 
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certain conditions—meaning it cannot be done otherwise.48 And, as discussed 
above, to do so violates the Utah Constitution’s Separation of Powers provision.  
E. The district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an offense not 
designated in Utah Code. Its only authority is to dismiss. 
Under Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 25, “The court shall dismiss the infor-
mation or indictment when … [t]he court is without jurisdiction.…”49 In Thomp-
son v. Jackson, this Court stated subject matter jurisdiction “is the power and 
authority of the court to determine a controversy and without which it cannot 
proceed.”50 “If a court acts beyond its authority those acts are null and void.”51 In 
State v. Todd it stated subject matter jurisdiction “is derived from the law.”52 “It 
can neither be waived nor conferred by consent of the accused.”53 In criminal 
                                              
48 See Utah Code § 76-3-402. 
49 Utah R. Crim. P. 25(b)(4). 
50 Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
51 Ibid. 
52 State v. Todd, 2004 UT App 266, ¶ 9, 98 P.3d 46. 
53 Ibid. 
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cases, “[t]he trial court simply would lack the judicial power to convict the de-
fendant of a nonexistent crime.”54 “Upon a determination by the Court that its ju-
risdiction is lacking, its authority extends no further than to dismiss the action.”55  
Failure to signal and failure to obey a traffic control device did not exist as in-
fractions when Maese was charged. Utah courts lack subject matter jurisdiction 
over non-existent offenses. Accordingly, the trial court retains only the authority 
to dismiss the action against Maese. 
POINT II. The Utah Constitution Unequivocally Guarantees Defendants Charged 
with Infractions the Right of Trial by Jury. 
Analyzing the Utah Constitution’s text, historical context, and Utah’s traditions 
at the time of its adoption reveals the Constitution guarantees the right to jury 
trials in all criminal cases, including prosecutions for infractions. Yet Utah Code 
and the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide jury trials for all offenses ex-
cept infractions.56  
The framers of the Utah Constitution, however, viewed the right of a trial by 
jury as sacrosanct in all criminal and civil cases, and conceived of no circum-
stance by which that right should be denied; including the right to a jury trial for 
                                              
54 State v. Norris, 2004 UT App 267, ¶ 21, 97 P.3d 732. 
55 Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Utah Ct. App. 1987 ) (citation omit-
ted). 
56 See Utah Code § 77-1-6(2)(e); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(d). 
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so-called “petty” offenses which was well established in the Utah territory long 
before, and in the state long after, the Constitution was adopted.  
Accordingly, any Utah statute or procedural rule denying the right of a jury 
trial in prosecutions for infractions is unconstitutional.  
A. The plain language of the Utah Constitution guarantees the right to jury 
trials in all cases.  
In American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, the Utah Supreme Court stated when 
courts interpret the Utah Constitution, courts should “analyze its text, historical 
evidence of the state of the law when it was drafted, and Utah’s particular tradi-
tions at the time of drafting.” 57 A court’s goal is to “discern the intent and pur-
pose of both the drafters of our constitution and, more importantly, the citizens 
who voted it into effect.”58 
 In State v. Hernandez, the Utah Supreme Court stated because “the best evi-
dence of the drafters’ intent is the text itself, our analysis begins with a review of 
                                              
57 Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 2006 UT 40, ¶ 12, 140 P.3d 1235. 
58 Ibid. 
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the constitutional text.”59 And in Salt Lake City v. Ohms, it stated, “if a constitu-
tional provision is clear, then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may 
not be resorted to.”60 
In its current state, Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution states: 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital 
cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, 
the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight persons. In other cases, the 
Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no event 
shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict 
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a 
verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.61 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution states in relevant part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right … to have a 
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed …62 
In 1996, a ballot measure amended Article I, § 10 to accommodate the consoli-
dation of circuit courts into the district court system.63 The original provision 
stated: 
                                              
59 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ¶ 8, 268 P.3d 822 (citations and quotations omit-
ted). 
60 Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850, n. 14 (Utah 1994). 
61 Utah Const. Art. I, § 10. 
62 Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. 
63 Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 12-13, December 8, 
1995, attached as Exhibit A.  
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In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of 
general jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four jurors. In 
criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths 
of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be waived unless 
demanded.64   
Here, sections 10 and 12 are plain and unambiguous. These provisions guar-
antee the right of a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. Section 10 addresses 
jury trials in general, and by the language, “In other cases, the Legislature shall 
establish the number of jurors,” “in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than 
four persons,” and “In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous,” the sec-
tion contemplates no situation where a defendant in a criminal action would not 
be entitled to a jury.  
If the drafters intended to limit the right based on the possibility of incarcera-
tion, they would have stated so explicitly. Section 12 addresses the rights of crim-
inal defendants in particular, stating, “In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right … to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.” This lan-
guage is also unequivocal, making no provision for a prosecution lacking the 
right to a jury trial. 
                                              
64 Utah Const. Art. I, § 10 (1896).  
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B. The framers conceived of no circumstance, whether civil or criminal, un-
der which the right to trial by jury should be denied.  
Assuming ambiguous text, the Utah Supreme Court stated constitutional inter-
pretation may also be informed by “historical evidence of the drafters’ intent.”65  
In Intern. Harvester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, the Utah Supreme Court squarely 
held that article I, § 10 guarantees the right to a jury trial in all civil cases. The 
court’s reasoning there was equally if not more applicable to criminal jury trials: 
The wording of Article I, § 10 lends itself to argument over the intended 
meaning as to noncapital criminal cases and civil cases. … A careful read-
ing, however, of the proceedings of the constitutional convention, Official 
Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, 1895, Vol. I, Pages 
258-62, 274-97, 492-95, discloses a virtually unanimous intention on the 
part of the framers of the Constitution to preserve a constitutional right 
to trial by jury in civil cases and in noncapital criminal cases.  
Although there was dispute in the convention over the number of jurors, 
and the degree of concurrence necessary for a verdict, there is repeated ref-
erence to the intention to insure the underlying right of trial by jury. The 
whole tenor of the discussion in the constitutional convention, the prelimi-
nary drafts, and the final language of Article I, § 10, indicates no intention 
to limit the constitutional right to a jury to capital criminal cases. 
… the constitutional designation of the number of jurors to be used in 
courts of original jurisdiction and in courts of inferior jurisdiction presup-
poses the existence of the basic right itself. It is not plausible that the fram-
ers would mandate the number of jurors to be used in a jury, and the 
number of jurors required to return a verdict, without intending to secure 
the basic right itself. 
                                              
65 State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ¶ 8, 268 P.3d 822 (citations and alterations omit-
ted). 
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… 
The jury historically has been an integral part of the Anglo-American legal 
system. It would require the clearest language to sustain the conclusion 
that there was an intention to abolish an institution so deeply rooted in 
our basic democratic traditions and so important in the administration of 
justice, not only as a buffer between the state and the sovereign citizens of 
the state, but also as a means for rendering justice between citizens. We re-
fuse to give a strained meaning to the terms of our Constitution which 
would result in dispensing with an institution that has the sanction of the 
centuries.66 
Thus, whether infractions are criminal or civil in nature, there is no question 
that Maese was entitled to a jury trial where no language—let alone the “clearest 
language”—suggests the framers intended to restrict the right in prosecutions for 
infractions.  
Indeed, the debate over the original provision never considered circumstances 
whereby a civil litigant or criminal defendant would be denied the right to trial 
by jury. The debate was whether the number of jurors in any case should remain 
at 12, or be reducible by constitution or statute. And no delegate understood the 
right to be limited by the potential punishment attached to an offense. In fact, ar-
guing against the ultimately successful reduction in the number of jurors for non-
capital felonies and “other cases,” delegate John Rutledge Bowdle said: 
                                              
66 Intern. Harvester Credit v. Pioneer Tractor, 626 P.2d 418, 419-20 (Utah 1981) (em-
phasis added). 
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I claim that a man’s liberty is not in jeopardy only when the doors of the 
penitentiary may stand before him, or when his life is at stake. His reputa-
tion might be just as sacred, or more sacred than his life. I believe that 
when a man is on trial for any crime he should have a fair and impartial 
trial by a jury, as the gentleman concedes, the best jury, that is a jury of 
twelve … 67 
The 1996 article I, section 10 amendment explicitly intended a technical rather 
than substantive change. Members of the Constitutional Revision Committee 
proposing the amendment to the Legislature, including two now-former Utah 
Supreme Court chief justices, never intended to alter the substance of the right as 
it has stood since the founding (they could not have altered the right by this 
amendment alone, since it remained unchanged under the more specific article I, 
section 12 provision). The amendment addressed the consolidation of inferior cir-
cuit courts with general jurisdiction district courts by establishing jury size based 
upon the type of case at issue rather than the type of court.68  
The Utah Constitutional Revision Commission understood that Utah courts 
have not determined if Utah’s constitutional jury right extends to those charged 
                                              
67 Official Report of The Proceedings and Debates of The Convention Assembled 
to Adopt a Constitution for The State of Utah, 291-92 (1898), attached as Ex-
hibit B.   
68 Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 12-13, December 8, 
1995, Exhibit A; Proposition No. 3: Jury Trial Resolution, Utah Voter Information 
Pamphlet, p. 27, 1996, attached as Exhibit C. 
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with petty offenses or infractions, and they never intended for the amendment to 
resolve that issue. 
Mr. James Housley, Deputy District Attorney, Salt Lake County … ex-
pressed concern that one could argue that people are entitled to a jury 
trial, even for petty offenses. Under federal constitutional provisions there 
have been a number of cases that have differentiated between petty cases 
and serious cases, he said. The differentiation is basically at six months po-
tential incarceration but Utah Supreme Court cases have discussed the dif-
ferentiation without actually holding that this is what is covered by the 
state constitution. He said they would likely not be precluded from using 
the federal interpretation. He requested that the use of the word ‘shall’ not 
be intended to change the jurisprudence surrounding the right to jury 
trial.69  
Then-Chief Justice Michael Zimmerman stated the Commission’s “express in-
tention is not to change anything and not to affect existing case law.”70 Zimmer-
man’s successor at the high court, Justice Christine Durham, agreed, indicating 
“the Judicial Council’s motivation in proposing the amendment was to maintain 
the operational status quo under the constitution.”71 Yet the article I, § 10, 
amendment drafters could have easily restricted the right to offenses carrying the 
possibility of incarceration, but consciously refrained. 
                                              
69 Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission, pp. 14-15, December 8, 
1995, Exhibit A.  
70 Id., p. 13. 
71 Id., p. 15. 
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In fact, early drafts of the proposed 1996 amendment, which took the form of 
a joint resolution of the Utah Legislature, explicitly limited the right, stating, 
“Parties have the right to trial by jury in any criminal case in which the Legisla-
ture has established a term of incarceration as a possible sentence.”72 But these 
were ultimately rejected. 
The article I, section 10 drafters—at the time of the framing, and a century 
later with the amendment—demonstrated no intention to restrict the jury trial 
right based on the possibility of incarceration. 
C. Utah’s traditions when the constitution was adopted entitled those 
charged with petty offenses to jury trials.  
At the adoption of the Utah Constitution, defendants charged with any criminal 
offense, included those not punishable by incarceration, were entitled to jury tri-
als and routinely received them upon demand. Thus, the law and the traditions 
around the time of the framing confirm that article I, sections 10 and 12 guaran-
tee jury trials to defendants charged with infractions. 
Very recently, in Simler v. Chilel, the Utah Supreme Court unanimously held 
that article I, section 10 “guarantees the right to a jury trial in small claims cases 
in a trial de novo in district court.”73 In Simler, the court reiterated that the “right 
                                              
72 See Jury Trial Resolution, 1996 General Session, November 27, 1995 Draft, 
1996FL-0689/003, attached as Exhibit D. 
73 Simler v. Chilel, 2016 UT 23, ¶ 2. 
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to a jury trial … extends only to cases that would have been cognizable at law at 
the time the constitution was adopted.”74 The court the reviewed the territorial 
laws and the revised statutes from immediately before and after adoption of the 
Utah Constitution, respectively, to conclude that parties in small claims actions 
were entitled to trials by jury in justice courts at the time of the framing.75 Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the legislature’s subsequent elimination of juries in 
small claims cases nearly a century later in 1992 violated article I, section 10.76 
The same reasoning yields the same conclusion here. That is, immediately be-
fore and after the framing, territorial and state law guaranteed jury trials to those 
charged with petty offenses and offenses that Utah Code now designates as in-
fractions. Indeed, the Complied Laws of Utah (pre-statehood) and the Revised 
Statutes of Utah (post-statehood) defined crimes identically as follows: 
A crime or public offense is an act committed or omitted in violation of a 
law forbidding or commanding it, and to which is annexed, upon convic-
tion, either of the following punishments: 
                                              
74 Id. at ¶ 12 (quoting Zions First National Bank v. Rocky Mountain Irrigation, Inc., 
795 P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1990)). 
75 See id. at ¶¶ 13-17. 
76 Id. at ¶ 17. See also State v. Hernandez, 2011 UT 70, ¶¶ 11-21, 268 P.3d 822, 
wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that defendants charged with class A 
misdemeanors are entitled to preliminary hearings under article I, section 13, 
despite Utah Code to the contrary, based on the understanding of the term 
“indictable offenses” at the time of the framing. 




4. Removal from office; or, 
5. Disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust 
or profit in this Territory.77 
 
Critically, criminal offenses were not limited to those punishable by death or 
imprisonment, but also included those punishable by fine, removal from office, or 
disqualification. Infractions under current Utah Code are materially no different, 
carrying punishments of fine, forfeiture, or disqualification.78 The legislature 
merely gave misdemeanors not punishable by imprisonment a different name 
with its repeal and reenactment of the Criminal Code in 1973.79 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure from the time of the 1973 overhaul of 
the Criminal Code continued to permit jury trials for all offenses, stating that 
criminal defendants are entitled “[t]o have a speedy public trial by an impartial 
                                              
77 UTAH COMP. LAWS § 4378 (1888) (emphasis added); UTAH REV. STAT. § 
4061 (1898), attached as Exhibit E. 
78 Utah Code § 76-3-201(2). 
79 See Utah Code § 76-3-102, designating offenses as “felonies, misdemeanors, or 
infractions,” as enacted by Chapter 196, Laws of Utah 1973, Gen. Sess. Since 
before statehood, and until the 1973 repeal and reenactment, offenses were 
designated as felonies and misdemeanors. See UTAH COMP. LAWS § 4379 
(1888) and UTAH REV. STAT. § 4062 (1898), attached as Exhibit E; Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-12 (1953). 
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jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed . . . .”80 
It was not until 1980, when the legislature repealed and reenacted the Utah Code 
of Criminal Procedure, that the statutory right to a jury trial was eliminated for 
infraction prosecutions.81 At that, the legislature would have had no cause to 
eliminate jury trials for infractions unless then-existing law at least implicitly per-
mitted them. 
                                              
80 Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-8(6) (1978). This the precise language from article I, sec-
tion 12. 
81 Utah Code § 77-1-6(2)(e) (enacted in its current form by Chapter 15, Laws of 
Utah 1980, Gen. Sess.): “No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a 
jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court 
when trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment 
of a magistrate.” (Emphasis added). 
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The Penal Code before82 and after83 statehood defined numerous crimes not 
punishable by imprisonment, or punishable by imprisonment of six months or 
                                              
82 See UTAH COMP. LAWS § 4401 (1888) (Taking rewards for deputation, pun-
ishable by $1,000 fine); § 4438 (Refusing to aid officers in arrest, etc., punisha-
ble by $100 fine); § 4479 (Duties of officers to prevent duels, punishable by 
$500 fine); § 4484 (Assault, punishable by $300 fine and three months jail); § 
4515 (Keeping open places of business on Sunday, punishable by $5-$100 
fine); § 4519 (Performing unnecessary labor on Sunday, punishable by $25 
fine); § 4522 (Selling liquor at camp or field meetings, punishable by $5-$500 
fine); § 4524 (Procuring females to play on musical instruments in public, 
punishable by $100 fine and one month jail); § 4525 (Procuring female to ex-
hibit herself for hire, punishable by $100 fine and one month jail); § 4573 (Put-
ting extraneous substances in packages of goods usually sold by weight with 
intent to increase weight, punishable by $25 fine for each offense); § 4598 (Dis-
turbing the peace, punishable by $200 fine and 60 days jail); § 4526 (Furnish-
ing liquor to a minor, punishable by $100 fine and 90 days jail). 
83 UTAH REV. STAT. § 4186 (1898) (officer fails to prevent a duel, punishable by 
$500 fine); § 4144 (refusal to aid officer, punishable by $100 fine); § 4085 (sell-
ing official appointment, punishable by $1,000 fine); § 4234 (keeping business 
open Sunday, punishable by $100 fine); § 4241 (selling liquor near camp meet-
ing, punishable by $500 fine); § 4243 (procuring female to dance, punishable 
by one month jail and $100 fine); § 4244 (procuring female to play music, pun-
ishable by one month jail and $100 fine); § 4310 (disturbing the peace, punish-
able by $200 fine and two months jail); § 4341 (unlawful entry of railroad car, 
punishable by $50 fine and 50 days jail). 
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less, which is the benchmark for “petty offenses” under federal constitutional ju-
risprudence beyond which a jury trial is guaranteed.84 Yet territorial law govern-
ing criminal procedure in justice courts did not distinguish the right according to 
the potential penalty, stating without qualification: “A trial by jury shall be 
deemed to be waived unless a jury be demanded by the defendant. If he demand 
a jury, it shall be formed in the manner provided in this chapter.”85 After state-
hood, the relevant provision governing criminal procedure in justice courts was 
equally unequivocal, stating, “A trial by jury shall be deemed to be waived un-
less a jury is demanded by either party.”86  
Finally, defendants charged with offenses not punishable by imprisonment, 
or with so-called “petty offenses” punishable by six months incarceration or less, 
routinely demanded and received jury trials around the time of the framing.87 
                                              
84 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (holding that potential imprison-
ment of greater than six months triggers right to jury trial under Sixth 
Amendment). 
85 UTAH COMP. LAWS § 5318 (1888), attached as Exhibit F. 
86 UTAH REV. STAT. § 5139 (1898), attached as Exhibit F. 
87 See e.g., Provo Daily Enquirer, “Sabbath-Breaking,” April 18, 1891 (defendant 
demanded and received jury trial in justice court found guilty and fined $1 for 
violating ordinance prohibiting labor on Sunday, punishable by fine only); 
Box Elder News, “Jury Disagrees,” July 29, 1915 (defendants charged under 
city ordinance for failing to gain permission to sell fruit on railroad company 
land, punishable by fine of $5 to $100, demanded and received jury trial in 
justice court, resulting in a hung jury); Provo Daily Enquirer, “Whisky on 
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More than a century ago, in Salt Lake City v. Robinson, the Utah Supreme Court 
addressed a very similar issue in determining whether punishment for violations 
of municipal ordinances was civil or criminal in nature, the Court stated:  
the courts of this state have always regarded the proceedings instituted for 
violations of ordinances as in their nature criminal, and not civil. Trials, so 
far, as we are aware have always been conducted upon that theory. Again 
the rules of evidence and the quantum of proof, as well as the rules of con-
struction and procedure applicable to criminal prosecutions, have always 
been applied and enforced in prosecutions for violations of city ordinances 
by the courts of this state. … We are clearly of the opinion that, under our 
statutes, prosecutions like the one at bar are in their nature criminal, and 
that the rules pertaining to criminal prosecutions for misdemeanors under 
the statute are applicable.88 
The same is true of infractions. That is, the rules of evidence, the quantum of 
proof, and the rules of construction are the same in a prosecution for a felony, 
misdemeanor, or infraction. The action is prosecuted by information in the name 
of a governmental entity rather than a private party. The action is subject to the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Defendants are subject to arrest for an infraction, and may be arrested if they fail 
to appear and face the charge of an infraction, rather than face default judgment 
                                              
Top,” February 27, 1891 (defendant demanded and received jury trial for sell-
ing alcohol to a minor, punishable by 90 days jail). Articles attached as Exhibit 
G. 
88 Salt Lake City v. Robinson, 39 Utah 260, 116 P.442 (Utah 1911). 
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in a civil action for failing to timely answer. There is also no question that the 
drafters of the “Utah Criminal Code” intended infractions to be “in their nature 
criminal,” when they designated criminal offenses as “felonies, misdemeanors, 
or infractions.”89  
Accordingly, Utah’s legal traditions and widespread practice at the time the 
Constitution was adopted entitled defendants to juries even for petty offenses, 
including infractions. Taken with the unambiguous plain text of article I, sections 
10 and 12, and the framers’ implicit and explicit refusals to condition the right on 
the possibility of incarceration, there is no doubt that the Utah Constitution guar-
antees the right to trial by jury for infractions. 
C O N C L U S I O N  
Maese respectfully asks this Court to declare the misdemeanor traffic offenses 
unconstitutional as applied to Maese because arbitrarily reducing misdemeanors 
to infractions violates article V, section 1; declare Utah Code subsection 77-1-
6(2)(e) and Rule 17(d) of Criminal Procedure unconstitutional under article I, sec-
tions 10 and 12; and order Judge Randall Skanchy to dismiss the Amended Infor-
mation against Maese for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or remand the case 
and empanel a jury. Maese urges the Court to rule on all fully briefed issues as 
                                              
89 Utah Code § 76-3-102. 
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they are likely to recur upon retrial of this matter.90 Maese also requests costs 
and, under the Court’s equitable powers, attorney’s fees given the benefit be-
stowed upon tens of thousands of Utah criminal defendants by vindicating the 
constitutional rights at issue in this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 22nd day of November, 2016. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
 
As amended through January 1, 2016
 
Rule 4. Prosecution of public offenses 
 
 
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information sworn
to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been committed.
 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being
prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by statute or by stating in
concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. If
issued, the information shall include the citation number. Failure to include the number will not
affect the court's jurisdiction. An information may contain or be accompanied by a statement of
facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropriate.
Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money, securities, written instruments,
pictures, statutes and judgments may be described by any name or description by which they are
generally known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details
concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law
nor matters of judicial notice need be stated.
 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an indictment or information.
 
(d) The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before trial has commenced
so long as the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. If an additional or different
offense is charged, the defendant has the right to a preliminary hearing on that offense as
provided under these rules and any continuance as necessary to meet the amendment. The court
may permit an indictment or information to be amended after the trial has commenced but before
verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant
are not prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to state the
offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the
same set of facts.
 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a defendant of the
nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the
defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment
Utah Code
Page 1
76-1-105 Common law crimes abolished.
          Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so by this code,
other applicable statute or ordinance.
Amended by Chapter 32, 1974 General Session




Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
 




§ 76-1-103. Application of code - Offense prior to effective date 
 
 
Cite as Utah Code § 76-1-103 
History. Enacted by Chapter 196, 1973 General Session 
 
 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment for, and
defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where otherwise specifically
provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this code;
provided such offense was committed after the effective date of this code.
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be governed by the
law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of commission thereof, except that a
defense or limitation on punishment available under this code shall be available to any
defendant tried or retried after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state
shall be deemed to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto.










§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense - Procedure and limitations 
 
(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the
offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, and after having given any victims present at the sentencing and the
prosecuting attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to
record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court
may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose
sentence accordingly.
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on
probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition of probation, the
court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense:
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation;
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney;
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to provide
notice to any victims;
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); and
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of
offense is in the interest of justice.
(3) (a) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, whether the
reduction is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the prosecutor specifically
agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two
degrees.
(b) In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than two
degrees.
(4) This section does not preclude any person from obtaining or being granted an
expungement of his record as provided by law.
 
Cite as Utah Code § 76-3-402 
History. Amended by Chapter 145, 2012 General Session , §12, eff. 5/8/2012. 
Amended by Chapter 103, 2007 General Session 
 
 
(5) The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense if:
(a) the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or
(b) if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the offense for which
the reduction is sought.
(6) When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under this section, the
actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made may not be altered.
(7) (a) A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a conviction that requires
the person to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements under
Title 77, Chapter 41, Sex and Kidnap Offender Registry, have expired.
(b) A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under
Subsection 77-41-105(3)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for
the offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender.
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an offense regarding
which:
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would
increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence; and
(b) the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section.
§ 10. Trial by jury. 
 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
 
Article I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
 
Current through November 3, 2015
 
§ 10. Trial by jury 
 
 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In capital cases the jury shall consist
of twelve persons, and in all other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of jurors by statute, but in no
event shall a jury consist of fewer than four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be
unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded. 
 
 
§ 12. Rights of accused persons. 
 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
 
Article I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
 
Current through November 3, 2015
 
§ 12. Rights of accused persons 
 
 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense. 
 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined
by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or
at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
 
 
§ 1. Three departments of government. 
 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
 
Article V. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
 
Current through November 3, 2015
 
§ 1. Three departments of government 
 
 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments,
the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of
powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining
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not reflect an intention to change the statutory scheme or existing law. 
Chair McKeachnie stated that the commission did not formally addre~ the intent 
language noted oo page 94 of the packeL 
Mr. Bird stated that the voter infonnation pamphlet could indicate that the commission 
recommended and the legislature passed a resolution that appears to be antiquated and redundant 
language and that there-is no intent 10 make a substantive-change to law. 
MOTION: Mr. Jensen moved to include. in the House and Senate Journals. and in the 
voter information pamphlet, tbe intent language,'1"his deletion is not intended 10 make a 
substantive change in the existing law," found on page 94 of the packet. 
Rep. Pignanelli asked how the intent language would be structured. He expressed 
concern how the commission could express the elecLOrates intent 
Ms. Watts Baskin stated that the House and Senate Journals would re11ect the intent of 
the legislature in making the amendment and the voters would know. through the Voter 
Information Pamphlel, that the intent of the ame,·•dment was not to change-current statutory 
interpretation but merely to remove archaic language from the constitution. 
The commission voted on the motion which passed unanimously. Sens. Beanie and 
Dmhrich, Justice Durham. Rep. Harward, and Ms. Wood were. absent during the vote. 
Th¢ comminion r<"<:~s~d for lunr:h. 
5. "Jury Trial Resolution," 1!196FL-0689!003, 11·27-95 DRAFf 
"Trial by Jury," 1996FL-0761/002, 11 ·29·95 DRAFf • 
Chief J ustice Michael D. Zinuner man, Utah Supreme Court, referred to the letter on 
page 99 of the packet thru was sent to the commission. When the court consolidation bill passed 
in 1991, it immediately consolidated lhe circuit and district couns in disuicts five through eight, 
he said. He explained that the Utah Constitution requires eigbt-pcrsonj urie.s in the trial coun of 
general jurisdiction, regnrdles.s of the-type of case. Unless there is a change in the constitution, 
coun consolidation will require the trial of lesser civil and c.riminal cases by an eight-penon jury, 
even though historically these types of cases have been tried in the circuit court by a fow- or six· 
person jury. The consolidated district c-Ourts in the Fifth through Eighth Judicial DiS-trias have-
been using eight-person juries since 1992 without undue: problems. Consolidation of the courts 
in tbc-populous Wasatch Front has brought with it the need for the same flexibility regarding jury 
size. That is the-reason for the proposed amendment, he said. The flexibHity wi11 allow cost 
Minutes of the Utah Constitutional Revision Commission 
December 8, 1995 
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savings by penniuingjuries of less than eight in rural districts where consolidation has already 
occurred. 
Mr. Strong asked if lbe· resolution would be puning in constitution that a capital case jury 
shall consist of twel\'e. 
Chief Justice Zimmennan explained that currently the constitution states that in .capital 
c-ases the right of trial by jury shaH remain inviolate. 
Justice Durham noted that there is some federaJ constitutional docuine to the-effect that 
twelve may be required. She said she did not think it had yet been decided. She expressed 
concern shouJd the conslitutional amendment pa.'iS and not the implementing statutes. 
Mr. Ralph Dewsnup, Utah Trial Lawyers Association, stated any change of the 
con.~ti tution which either grants more power to the Legislature or takes some· away should be 
closely scrutiniz.cd. He said anytime there is an amendment, it may be considered to amend 
everything that preceded it, both by way of judicial interpretation and the text of the constitution 
itself. There is not, and ne"er has been, a provision in the state constitution that guaranteed the 
right to a civil jury trial. It is an implied right. There arc Supreme Coun cases that hold that thjs 
section of the constitution grants the right w a ch.•il jury trial. If the constitution is ameaded and 
the Legislature is granted the authority to set the number of jurors. it can be a potential problem 
to allow the Leg.islature to do away with the right to civil trial by specifying that the number of 
jurors in cena.in trials will be 0 or 2. He suggested that one way to address that potential problem 
is to make explicit in the constitution that there is an inviolate right to civil jury trial unless 
waiv~d. 
Justice Durham said the language suggested by Mr. Dcwsnup would not fix the problem 
he raised bccaw;e civil cases generally would apply possibly to adjudication in juvenile coun and 
also to small claims court. 
Chief Justice Zim.mennan stated their express intention is not to change-anything and not 
to affect existing case Jaw. If that intent is expressed in tbc CRC repon to the Legislature, h may 
address tbe problem. 
Chair McKeachnie pointed out that the commission could put the intent in its repon to 
the Legislature and make sure that it is read into the record in the House and Senate Journals and 
could be in the Voter lnfonnation Pamphlet. 
Mr. Sullivan read the Seventh Amendment of tbe United State Constitution. He-was not 












Mr. EVANS (Weber). If you wlll permit me_I know that you want to get it right. 
The substitute which I offer provides that a jury shall be waived in civil cases, 
if not demanded, as the Legislature might provide. That makes a provision 
that unless a jury is demanded it is waived. That system is in effect now in 
New York, Michigan, and Tennessee, and in quite a number of other states, 
and I intend to speak about that. It is adopted in those states and the people 
are trying a vast number of cases before the courts, without resorting to the 
jury at all. 
 
Mr. EICHNOR. I will read it again: “The right of trial by jury shall remain 
inviolate, but in civil actions the jury shall consist of nine in district courts, and 
in inferior courts of six, or less, as the Legislature may provide; a verdict in 
such cases, may be rendered by concurrence by two-thirds of the jurors. A 
jury may be waived in civil cases and in misdemeanors by consent of both 
parties, expressed in open court.” That fixes it in the bill of rights. We know 
exactly what we have. We know exactly what we present to the people; there 
can be no misgivings in the minds of the people when we present the 
Constitution for their adoption or rejection. 
“In civil actions or misdemeanors the jury may consist of any number, less 
than the number fixed in this section.” I think that comes right down to the root 
of all this argument. Let us fix it in the bill of rights and fix it such a way that a 
Legislature in simple aberration of the mind will not endanger the jury system. 
I believe we ought to show something for our work, ought to show something 
for the time we are consuming here. Fix it right in the bill of rights, and we 
know what we have and no one can take it from us. All this talk about bulwark 
of liberty_what will be the bulwark of liberty in in Utah? The bill of rights will be 
the main spring of the liberty of this State, and I hope that every amendment 
will be voted down, and when the time comes I shall introduce this. 
Mr. BOWDLE. The bill, as amended by Mr. Van Horne, does not meet my 
approbation. Neither does the one that was introduced by the gentleman from 
Weber. There is one trouble with the amendment as I see it introduced by Mr. 
Evans, that is this: It provides that in offenses less than a felony a person may 
be tried by a jury of less than twelve; the argument that the gentleman has 
made against a jury of twelve is broken in my opinion by his concession that in 
all criminal cases it shall be twelve. If it shall be twelve in all criminal cases of 
felony, why, if nine is so good, if nine be such an admirable jury, or any jury 
less then nine be such a great institution, why does he concede that when we 
come to try a man for his life, it shall be twelve. The very admission is that a 
jury of twelve is better than nine. He admits it when he makes that argument. 
I. claim that a man's liberty is not in jeopardy only when the doors of the 
penitentiary may stand before him, or when his life is at stake. His reputation 
might be just as sacred, or more sacred than his life. I believe that when a 
man is on trial for any crime he should have a fair and impartial {292} trial by a 
jury, as the gentleman concedes the best jury, that is a jury of twelve, and for 
that reason I am not in favor of that amendment. I am not in favor of a sliding 
jury system. I believe we ought to know what kind of a jury we are going to 
have. If we are going to have a jury of twelve men, let us have a jury of twelve, 
and not leave it to the Legislature. If we are going to have a jury of nine, let us 
say so, and not have a jury this year of nine, and the next Legislature that 
meets thinks that is not quite good enough and they make a change, saying 
we have a jury of twelve. We have a jury of twelve for two years. The next 
Legislature comes along and says that it is too much expense, let us cut it 
down to eight, or six, or five. People rebel against it and you keep going 
back, and from that one thing to the other all the time, and you do not know 
where you are. Gentlemen, let me ask you this question. Solve it each one for 
yourself; if you had grave property interests at stake would you prefer to have 
a jury of eight, a jury of twelve, or a jury of four? On general principles, 
everything else being equal, there is not a man in this house, I do not believe, 
even the gentleman that has argued that the jury system should be cut down, 
but would say I will take the largest number you give me. Why? Because he 
feels that in that his interests are more nearly protected than in the smaller 
number. He feels that the opportunities for the other side to come around and 
work the jury, are not so good. Therefore, I am not in favor of cutting the jury 
down to a smaller number. 
I can see my way to vote for a jury of nine, but as I now see it, I cannot 
consent to vote to give it into the hands of the Legislature, to make it any 
number less than that. Nor, am I in favor of referring it to them to fix any 
number. 
I say let us fix it here now and settle that matter. Why, says the gentleman, we 
are progressing. Yes, it has taken 
five hundred years to come from a jury of twelve down to have this 
Convention say that a jury of nine will do. If it takes five hundred years to 
come from the idea of twelve down to nine, I think we can safely fix it at nine 
and rest easy there for a time at least. We are not going to grow so rapidly at 
that ratio, that we will need to have a jury of five or six in the age of the 
gentleman that has just been speaking. One thing further on that same thing. 














JURY TRIAL RESOLUTION 
Votes cast by the members of the Legislature at the 
1996 General Session on final passage: 
HOUSE (75 members): Yeas, 69; Nays, 3; Absent, 3. 
SENATE (29 members): Yeas, 28; Nays, I; Absent, O. 
Official Ballot Title: 
Shall the Utah Constitution be amended to modify the 
provisions on jury size for certain types of court cases 
so that: (a) juries in capital cases must consist of twelve 
persons, (b) juries in all other felony cases must consist 
of at least eight. and (c) juries in other cases must have 
their sizes established by the Legislature, but in no 
event can ajury be less than four? 
Impartial Analysis 
Proposal 
Proposition 3 amends the present provisions in the Utah 
Constitution which establish jury sizes based upon which 
court hears the case and instead provides for jury size to be es-
tablished based upon which type of case the court hears. The 
proposal also imposes a restriction on the Legislature that in 
no event shall a jury consist of less than four persons. 
Jury Sizes and Proposed Constitutional Changes 
The Legislature and the Judiciary have consolidated the 
circuit courts into the district courts, eliminating the circuit 
courts. This change means that circuit courts, courts of inferi-
or jurisdiction which heard less complicated and less serious 
civil and criminal matters. no longer exist, and district courts. 
courts of general jurisdiction, try the types of cases the circuit 
courts previously handled while retaining their own caseload 
as district courts. Courts of general jurisdiction, district 
courts. are presently required by Article I, Section 10 to have 
an eight member jury in all cases, except in capital cases which 
require twelve jurors. 
Under this proposal, all cases that were tried at the circuit 
court with a four member jury, such as Class Band C misde-
meanor trials, would still be tried with a four member jury in 
the consolidated district court. Similarly, all cases that were 
tried at the circuit court with a six member jury, such as Class 
A misdemeanor trials, would still be tried with a six member 
jury in the consolidated district court. Felony cases currently 
tried hy an eight member jury or capital cases currently tried 
27 
by a twelve member jury in the district court would still be 
tried by the same size juries in the consolidated district court. 
Unless there is a change in the Utah Constitution. the 
present constitutional language will require the trial of lesser 
civil and criminal cases by an eight memherjury in theconsol-
idated district couns, even though these types of cases histori-
cally have been tried in the circuit court by a four or six mem-
ber jury. 
Legislation Effective on Passage of Proposition 3 
S.B. 53. Trial by Jury, 1996 General Session. will become 
law on January I. 1997 only if Proposition 3 is approved. The 
bill retains language on capital and felony case size juries. rep 
tains the denial of jury trials in small claims cases, and retains 
the right of parties to agree to a lesser-sized jury in all cases 
except capital cases. S.B. 53 changes jury sizes in other types 
of cases in the district court, designates that a verdict must be 
unanimous in criminal cases and not less than three-fourths of 
the jurors in civil cases, and repeals the language specifying 
jury sizes in justice court cases. The bill eliminates juries in 
juvenile court in the adjudications of minors charged with 
what would constitute a crime if committed by an adult. 
Effective Date 
Proposition 3 takes effect January I, 1997. 
Fiscal Impact 



















P R E L I M I N A R Y P R O V I S I O N S . 877 
a n y p roceed ings r ounded upon a charge of p e r j u r y committed in such examina-
tion. [C . L | 4877. 
Vn\. Pen. ('. j} 14. Per jury . ft 41£>-fti:ii>. 
4061. Gr ime denned. A crime or public offense is an act committed or 
o m i t t e d i n v i o l a t i o n o f a l a w f o r b i d d i n g o r c o m m a n d i n g i t . a n d to which is 
annexed, upon conviction, a n y of t h e following p u n i s h m e n t s : 
! . D e a t h . 
'J. I m p r i s o n i n e n t . 
:;. F i n e . 
4. R e m o v a l from oll iee. 
5. D i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n to h o l d and en j oy any o i l i e r of honor , t r u s t , or profit in 
t i n s s tate . [<\ L . ^ 4378. 
( 'al. IVu . C . \ 15. by judicial proceedings, Con. art. BOO. - I ; ft 
Removal from office by im.peach.ment, Con. art. t.-i<>5 1580. 
(i. Bees, 17-21: ft/, 4548-4564. Bemoval from offiee 
4 0 6 2 . Cr imes , how divided. Crimes are divided i n t o : 
1. Felonies. 
2. M i s d e m e a n o r s . [ Q L . £ 4370. 
Ca l . Pen. C . § 1(1. 
4 0 6 3 . F e l o n y denned. Misdemeanor defined. A felony is a crime 
w h i c h is o r m a y be p u n i s h a b l e w i t h d e a t h , o r by imprisonment i n the State 
pr i s on . Every other crime is a misdemeanor, [c. L . ^ 4380. 
Ca l . Pen. C . # 17*. form a du ly prescribed Uy law, ;i naiwlemeanor, 
Prohibited aets lor whieh mi penalty is imposed t 4158, 
are misdemeanors, % 1154. Wi l ful omission to per* 
4064 . Pena l ty for felony w h e n not prescribed. Corporations. 
K x c c p t i n eases w h e r e a different punishment is prescribed by l aw , eve ry offense 
dec lared to be a f e l ony i s p u n i s h a b l e by i m p r i s o n m e n t i n t l i e s tate p r i s o n not 
e xceed ing l i v e years . I n a l l cases where a c o r p o r a t i o n is c o n v i c t e d of a n offense 
for t he commission o f w h i c h a natural person w o u l d be punishable as for a f e l o m . 
a m i there is no o t h e r punishment prescribed by law . such corporation is punish-
able by a l i n e of no t less t h a n l i v e hundred a n d not m o r e t h a n ten t h o u s a n d 
do l l a r s . [C . 1.. § 4:5X1* 
N. Dak. (1886) \ 6611; Ca l . IVu . ('. \ 18». 
Court to determine ami impose penalty, ft 40~>S, itiM, Cr iminal action auainst oorporatiiui, ft :>n; I :»u> 
4065 . Pena l ty for misdemeanor when not prescribed. Corpora -
tions. Except i n eases w h e r e a different p u n i s h m e n t is prescribed by l aw . e ve ry 
offense d e c l a r ed to be a m i s d e m e a n o r is pun i shab l e b y Imprisonment i n a count} 
j a i l not exceeding s i x m o n t h s , or by a l i n e in any s u m less t h a n th r e e h u n d r e d 
dollars, or by both. I n a l l oases w h e r e a c o r p o r a t i o n is c o n v i c t e d of an offense 
for the c o m m i s s i o n of which a natural person w o u l d be p u n i s h a b l e as for a m isde -
meanor , a n d t h e r e is no o t h e r p u n i s h m e n t prescr ibed by l a w . such c o r p o r a t i o n is 
p u n i s h a b l e b y a f ine not exceeding one thousand d o l l a r s . [ ( ' . L« ?i 4382* . 
Cat. Pen. C . \ 
Court to determine ami impose penalty. \\ 4058, I05W. 
4066 . Fe lon ious misconduct in office. Forfeiture. Disqual i f i -
cation. T h e conviction o f a n y s ta te , c o u n t y , city, t o w n , o r prec inc t ot l ieer of a 
fe lony i n v o l v i n g misconduct i n of l ice, i n v o l v e s as a consequence, in a d d i t i o n to 
i h e punishment p resc r ibed by l a w , a f o r f e i t u r e of h i s ol l iee. a n d d i squa l i f i e s h i m 
ever afterwards f r o m h o l d i n g a n y p u b l i c of l ice i n t h i s s ta te . 
Mont. Pen . <'. J; 196*. Disqualification by erime, $£4111, CUT. 
4067 . W h o deemed hab i tua l c r imina l . Pena l ty . W h o e v e r has been 
previously t w i c e c o n v i c t e d of c r i m e , sentenced, and c o m m i t ted to prison, i n t h i s or 
a n v o t h e r s ta te , o r once i n t h i s o r once at least in any other s ta te , fo r terms o f not 
less t h a n t h r e e y e a r s each, s h a l l upon c o n v i c t i o n of a f e lony committed i n t h i s 




JUSTICES' COURTS. 1 0 4 5 
F O R M A T I O N O F T H E J U R Y . 
5138 . T r i a l in defendant's absence forbidden. Excep t i on . T h e 
t r i a l m u s t n o t proceed i n t h e absence of t h e d e f e n d a n t , unless he v o l u n t a r i l y 
absents h i m s e l f w i t h f u l l k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e t r i a l is b e i n g had. [C. L . ^ 5 8 1 4 * . 
Ca l . Ten . C . g 1434*. 
5 1 3 9 . J u r y w a i v e d un less demanded. A t r i a l by j u r y sha l l be deemed 
to be w a i v e d unless a j u r y is d e m a n d e d b y either party. [C. L . § 5318 . 
Ca l , Pen. C. i I486*. against c i ty ordinance* \ 241. Trial must be by 
W h e n defendant not entit led to j u r y for otl'ense j u r y unless the same is waived, 'ft 4516,4810. 
5140 . Ju ro r s : summoning , qual i f ications, chal lenges. T h e quali-
fications of. a n d m a n n e r of s u m m o n i n g j u r o r s t o s e r ve i n j u s t i c e s ' c o u r t s are 
p r e s c r i b ed t i n d e r t h e t i t l e of " . J u r o r s " t i t l e t h i r t y - f i v e o f the Rev i sed S ta tu t e s . 
T h e provisions of chapter t h i r t y - t w o o f t h e code of c r i m i n a l p r o c edur e , r e l a t i v e to 
c h a l l e n g i n g j u r o r s , s h a l l g o v e r n , as f a r as the same s h a l l be applicable. [ C . L. 
S$ 5:518* 5 3 1 9 * , a n d 5 3 2 9 * . 
Ca l . Pen . C . {J 1435*. 
. lun.rs . ft 12M-1323. Cha l l eng ing j u ro r s , ft 4Hlti 4*11. 
THE TRIAL . 
5 1 4 1 . Oath adminis tered to j u ry . T h e j u r y h a v i n g been i m p a n e l e d 
the c o u r t m u s t a d m i n i s t e r t o t h e m t h e f o l l o w i n g o a t h : " Y o u do swear t h a t y o u 
w i l l w e l l a n d t r u l y t r y t h i s issue be tween t h e s ta te of U t a h a n d A B , t h e d e f e n d -
a n t , a n d a t r u e v e r d i c t r e n d e r a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e v i d e n c e . " [C. L. § 5 3 3 0 * . 
Ca l . I V n . OL \ 1437*. 
5 1 4 2 . Duty of j u ry . Pub l i c tr ia l , etc. A f t e r t h e j u r y s h a l l be s w o r n 
t h e y m u s t s i t t o g e the r a n d hear t h e proo fs a n d a l l e g a t i o n s of t h e parties which 
mus t be d e l i v e r e d in p u b l i c a n d i n t h e presence o f the d e f e n d a n t . [C . L . if 5 3 3 1 . 
Gal. Pen. 0 . \ 143M. W h e n tutting* public, \ (105; when not, \ 80& 
5 1 4 3 . Cour t to decide questions of l a w ; cannot charge a s to 
facts. The c o u r t m u s t dec ide a l l questions of l a w which may ar i se i n the course 
of t h e t r i a l , but can give no charge w i t h respect t o m a t t e r s of f ac t . [C . L. 
S 5332 . 
Ca l . P en . C . '{ 148& 
5 1 4 4 . J u r y m a y decide in court or retire. Oa th of officer. A f t e r 
h e a r i n g t h e proofs a n d a l l e g a t i o n s , t h e j u r y m a y decide in cour t o r m a y retire for 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . I f t h e y do n o t immediately agree, a n o l l i c e r m u s t be s w o r n t o the 
f o l l o w i n g effect: " Y o u do swea r t h a t y o u w i l l keep t h i s j u r y t o g e t h e r in some 
quiet a n d c onven i en t place, t h a t y o u w i l l n o t permit a n y person t o speak to them, 
n o r speak to t h e m yourself, un l ess b y o r d e r of t h e c o u r t . Or to ask t h e m w h e t h e r 
t h e y have agreed u p o n a verdict; and t h a t y o u w i l l r e t u r n them i n t o c our t w hen 
they s h a l l have so agreed , o r w h e n o rde r ed b y t h e c o u r t . " [ 0 . L . 5333 . 
Cal . Pen. <'. | 1440. 
5 1 4 5 . Verd ic t de l ivered in publ ic . E n t r y of. When t h e jury shall 
have agreed on t h e i r v e r d i c t , t h e y m u s t deliver i t p u b l i c l y to t i n ' c o u r t , w h o m u s t 
e n t e r i t , o r cause i t to be e n t e r e d , u p o n t h e n j i n u t c s . [C . L S 5334 . 
Cal . Pen. C , \ 1441* 
Verdict of j u r y most be unanimous, Con, art. I, see. m . 
5 1 4 6 . Verd ict as to one or more of defendants. R e t r i a l of 
others. W hen severa l d e f e n d a n t s sha l l be t r i e d toge ther , i f t h e j u r y canno t 
agree u p o n a v e r d i c t as to a l l , t h e y m a y r e n d e r a v e r d i c t as to those i n regard t o 
w h o m t h e y d o agree, o n which a j u d g m e n t m u s t be e n t e r e d accordingly, a n d t h e 
case as t o t h e rest m a y be t r i e d by a n o t h e r j u r y . [C . L . § 5335. 
Ca l . Pen. C . \ 1442. 
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